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Non-Standard Employment and Labour Force Participation: 
A Comparative View of the Recent Development in Europe
* 
 
This paper presents – in a new way of examination and portrayal – the extent and changes of 
nonstandard employment relationships (part-time work, fixed-term contracts, and self-
employment) in 24 EU member states at two points of time, in 1998 and 2008, on the basis of 
the European Labour Force Survey. Apart from a detailed statistical description by gender, 
skills and branches, theoretical considerations explaining the development are also examined 
and tested in a preliminary way. Finally, the most important results and their challenges to the 
future labour market policy are emphasised again and discussed. The central outcome is 
neither the complaint of the eroding ‘standard employment relationship’ nor of its potential 
‘precariousness’; it is rather the requirement of increasing variability in employment relations 
due to rising employment participation of women (work-life-balance), mature aged workers, 
and persons with restricted work capacities. However, parallel to this development social 
risks are also spreading over the life course, especially the risk of great income volatility 
through multiple or long periods of unemployment, changing working times, obsolete skills or 
restricted work capacities due to ill health. In order to reduce or to avoid new social 
inequalities, future labour market reforms have to acknowledge this development by 
establishing new forms of social security or by constituting a more flexible standard 
employment relationship through adaptations in labour and social law. The contribution ends 
by providing some suggestions to such reforms. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite  the  current  crisis,  which  led  again  to  mass  unemployment  in  many 
countries,  the  long-term  perspective  of  most  EU  member  states  is  still  one  of 
labour shortage for two reasons: one quantitative related to the ageing society, one 
qualitative  related  to  the  rapid  change  of  technology  and  global  competition. 
Whereas  migration  might  fill  this  gap  to  some  extent,  raising  labour  force 
participation of the native population is generally seen as the more sustainable 
solution.  Furthermore,  changing  work  preferences,  especially  among  women 
traditionally tied to unpaid work in the private households, hint to unexploited 
potentials of endogenous factors driving labour force participation. Preferences 
for labour market participation might still be blocked by institutional barriers of 
various  sorts:  employment  protection,  tax  disincentives,  lack  of  child  care  or 
elderly care infrastructure, and wage discrimination. 
Other  important  factors  slowing  down  the  potential  increase  in  labour  force 
participation are all sorts of regulations that enforce outdated standards of the 
employment relationship. Such standards – traditionally defined as open-ended 
contracts in dependent full-time work, possibly further restricted to one employer 
and  five  days  a  week  from  nine  o’clock  in  the  morning  to  six  o’clock  in  the 
evening – limit both the use of flexible labour for the employers as well as the 
opportunity of variable employment over the life course for the employees.  
The last decades, however, have seen an erosion of this – conventionally defined 
–  “standard  employment  relationship”  through  part-time  work,  fixed-term 
contracts, temp-agency work and self-employment. Whereas many welcomed this 
development as a blessing for flexible labour markets, others were highly critical 
and hinted very early to disastrous intended or unintended side-effects such as low 
or volatile income, dead-end jobs instead of stepping stones, high job insecurity, 
and  poverty  in  old-age.  At  the  beginning  of  this  century,  the  European 
Commission  stepped  in  as  a  kind  of  broker  by  recommending  to  direct  the 
European  Employment  Strategy  towards  a  proper  balance  of  flexibility  and  
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security (Kok et el. 2004), dubbed already early by ingenious Dutch researchers as 
‘flexicurity’ (Wilthagen 1998). 
Varying a well-known saying by Martin Luther with respect to his wife: ‘as we 
have got this term, we have to like it.’ All the more, since a further increase of 
labour force participation seems inevitably be connected with a greater variety of 
employment  relationships.  The  aim  of  the  following  essay  is  to  test  this 
assumption  in  a  preliminary  way  through  systematic  descriptive  work  and 
conceptual  reflections:  first  by  comparing  the  development  of  non-standard 
employment in EU member states from 1998 to 2008; second by relating this 
development to the dynamics of economic welfare and labour force participation; 
third  by  exploring  some  determinants  to  explain  this  development;  fourth  by 
discussing  the  policy  consequences  aimed  at  ensuring  a  complementary 
relationship between flexibility and security rather than trading-off one against the 
other; fifth by summarising the main results and concluding. 
2.  The Change of the Employment Relationship in the European Union 
The following view on the dynamics of the employment relationship is based on 
the  European  Labour  Force  Survey  using  the  following  definitions  for  labour 
force participation and non-standard employment: 
-  (1)  Activity  rate  /  or  labour  force  participation  rate  =  (Employed  + 
Unemployed) as per cent of working age population (age 15 to 64)
2 
-  (2) Part-time employment rate = employed in part-time work and in open-
ended  contracts  or  in  own  account  work
3  as  per  cent  of  working  age 
population; or as a share of total employment 
                                                 
2    Notice that “labour force participation” is measured by including the unemployed who belong 
– in functional terms – to the active labour force (i.e., being available to the labour market 
and willing to work). The downside of this measure is spoiling international comparability 
since  the  measurement  of  unemployment  between  countries  varies  more  than  the 
measurement of employment despite ILO or OECD standards especially at the margin of the 
ages and with respect to health related employability. Related to the latter, the standard for 
employability applied in Germany for instance is (since 2003) stricter than in Denmark or in 
the Netherlands. Konle-Seidl/ Eichhorst (2008) find that Dutch unemployment rates would 
almost double by applying the German standards.  
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-  (3)  Fixed-term  employment  rate  =  employed  in  fixed-term  contracts 
(including temp-agency work with fixed-term contracts and part-timers in 
fixed-term contracts) as per cent of working age population; or as a share 
of total employment 
-  (4) Self-employment rate = own account workers (self-employed without 
dependent employees) in full-time as per cent of working age population; 
or as share of total employment 
-  (5) (Aggregate) Non-standard employment rate = sum of (2, 3 and 4) as 
per cent of working age population; or as share of total employment. 
The statistical analysis uses a special data set of EUROSTAT which allows, by 
using a filter, to put the three components of non-standard employment together to 
an aggregate figure of non-standard employment. The figures usually published 
cannot  be  added  since  categories  overlap:  part-timers  may  be  on  a  fixed-term 
contract, and temporary workers may work full-time. On the other hand, this data 
set  leaves  open  the  option  to  separate  part-time  from  full-time  fixed-term 
contracts or to distinguish between part-time and full-time own self-employment 
if the analytical perspective requires such a differentiation. 
Figure 1 shows the development of the (aggregate) non-standard employment rate 
for 24 EU member states
4. The first pattern we can see is the fact that countries 
belonging to the so-called social-democratic regime, here including Netherlands a 
‘hybrid’,  rank  highest  in  terms  of  the  combined  indicator  for  non-standard 
employment.
5 
                                                                                                                                      
3    Notice that self-reported „part-time“ is used here, which includes both the possibility that 
some  people  are  in  an  open-ended  full-time  contract  but  actually  work  part-time,  or  the 
possibility that people are in an open-ended part-time contract but actually work more than 35 
hours. 
4    Excluded are – for reasons of data limitations or exceptionality – Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta. 
5    I refer to the classic ‘regime’-typology by Esping-Andersen (1990); Netherlands as a ‘hybrid’ 
contains ‘conservative’ elements as well. See Appendix 1 for country abbreviations.  
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Figure 1:  Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe,  







































Source:  Eurostat,  Labour  Force  Survey;  own  calculations;  the  “aggregate”  non-standard 
employment  rate  includes  part-time,  fixed-term  and  own  account  work  controlling  for 
overlaps; the EU-average excludes Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus; see footnote 5. 
 
However, with around one quarter of the working-age population non-standard 
employment is also fairly well developed in the ‘liberal’ system of UK, and even 
in  family  centred  or  so-called  conservative  employment  systems  like  Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
6 
On the other hand, it is remarkable that most of the new member states cluster 
together in the left corner of the figure, which means displaying low non-standard 
employment  rates  of  around  10  percent,  and  some  countries  showing  even 
declining rates. 
This leads to the second pattern that immediately can be observed from Figure 1. 
Most  countries  are  situated  above  the  diagonal  line,  which  means  above  the 
implicit time axis. If all countries would lie on this diagonal, nothing would have 
changed from 1998 to 2008. This is true for some countries, e.g. for UK, Greece, 
                                                 
6    May be catholic Poland can be counted to this regime-type as well.  
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and Hungary. Some countries, especially Lithuania and Latvia, experienced even 
a decline in the aggregate non-standard employment rate. In most other countries, 
however, especially in Italy, Poland, Spain, Germany and Netherlands, the non-
standard employment rate increased by about five to ten percentage points. 
By decomposing non-standard employment into its three components of part-time 
work, fixed-term employment and self-employment, our expectation is confirmed: 
part-time work is the most prominent element in non-standard  employment of 
most  countries.  As  already  hinted  at  the  beginning  by  pondering  about  the 
definition  of  “standard”  employment  from  a  life-course  perspective,  there  are 
good reasons to argue that at least open-ended part-time work in the range of 20 to 
35 hours deserves to be counted as standard, and not “atypical” anymore. Part-
time  work  is  common  especially  in  well  developed  knowledge  and  service 
economies. Part-time employment rates – including the non-trivial number of self-
employed people working in part-time – however display great variation between 
the EU member states, ranging from one percent in Romania to 27 percent for 
“champion” Netherlands. The fixed-term employment rates (including part-timers 
with fixed-term contracts) vary “only” between (roughly) one percent in Romania 
again and 16 percent in Spain; whereas the self-employment rate (excluding part-
time) displays a minimum of two percent (Luxembourg) and a maximum of 12 
percent (Greece).
7  
Behind any variation of figures there are possibly hidden patterns. Are these three 
components  of  “flexible”  employment  complementary  or  substitutive?  A  first 
answer to this question can be found by simply correlating the various forms of 
non-standard employment across the 24 country observations in 2008. In order to 
avoid auto-correlations, we further subdivide self-employment into part-time and 
full-time,  and  do  the  same  with  fixed-term  contracts,  which  leaves  –  as  fifth 
element – part-time work in form of open-ended contracts.  
                                                 
7    See the corresponding figures in Appendix 2.  
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Table 1:  Correlates of non-standard employment in 2008 
  Part-time
1)  Fixed-term  Fixed-term  Self-empl.
2)  Self-empl.
2) 
  (Open-ended)  (Full-time)  (Part-time)  (Full-time)  (Part-time) 
Part-time  
(Open-ended) 
1.00         
Fixed-term  
(Full-time) 
- 0.07  1.00       
Fixed-term  
(Part-time) 
0.68  0.34  1.00     
Self-employed  
(Full-time) 
- 0.46  0.14  - 0.19  1.00   
Self-employed  
(Part-time) 
0.49  0.28  0.62  0.15  1.00 
Source:  Eurostat,  Labour  Force  Survey,  own  calculations;  N  =  24  Member  States  of  the  EU  (without 
Bulgaria, Malta, Cyprus);  
Strong (‘significant’) coefficients (>= 0.30) are in bold 
1) Part-time according to self-assessment; without self-employed 
2) Own account workers (without dependent employees) 
The  strong  positive  correlation  between  open-ended  and  fixed-term  part-time 
employment  (r=0.68)  is  intuitively  clear  since  both  contractual  forms  are 
complementary. One can plausibly assume that a majority of open-ended part-
time  employment  is  the  continuation  of  fixed-term  part-time  work.  The  same 
explanation can be given for the positive correlation between fixed-term part-time 
work and fixed-term full-time work (r=0.34), in other words: a substantial part of 
fixed-term  part-time  contracts  might  lead  to  fixed-term  full-time  contracts, 
although such interpretations cannot directly be derived from such correlations.  
A bit more difficult to explain is the strong correlation between fixed-term part-
time employment and part-time self-employment (r=0.62). Common underlying 
causal factors of this correlation probably are supply constraints, in particular of 
single or married women (or of the few single men) having children who can 
devote  only  part  of  their  time  to  gainful  employment.  This  interpretation  is 
corroborated by the significant correlation between open-ended part-time work 
and part-time self-employment (r=0.49).
8 
                                                 
8    One is also tempted to explain this correlation by the possible combination of gainful part-
time  work  (as  the  main  and  reliable  income  source)  and  part-time  self-employment  (as 
experimental area of additional income or ‘self-realisation’). However, the nature of the data 
does not allow this conclusion since individuals are counted by the main occupation they are  
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The  most  interesting  result  of  this  exercise  is  the  strong  negative  correlation 
between  full-time  self-employment  and  open-ended  part-time  work  (r=-0.46), 
which indicates a substitutive relationship between these forms of non-standard 
employment. This would mean, as far as this interpretation is correct, that not all 
forms of non-standard employment are driving labour force participation – at least 
not for all target groups. This substitutive pattern forecasts the decline of full-time 
self-employment in favour of part-time employment especially for countries that 
need  to  catch  up  with  the  ‘developed’  countries  in  terms  of  non-standard 
employment and labour force participation. Furthermore, it can be assumed that 
formerly self-employed people in agriculture, retailing or sweat-shops transit into 
dependent part-time work and combine this small but regular income with volatile 
income from various kinds of informal work on the side (especially in small-sized 
agricultural production), moonlighting or even illegal work.  
The differentiation of these observations by gender provides further hints to the 
reasons of rising non-standard employment. Figures 2 and 3 clearly show that the 
variation of non-standard employment among women in the EU is much higher 
than among men. The minimum and maximum non-standard employment rates 
for men vary between 8 percent (Estonia) and 30 percent (Netherlands) in 2008; 
however, for women, they range from 6 percent (Slovak Republic) to 56 percent 
(Netherlands).  Whereas  non-standard  employment  of  women  increased  (apart 
from Romania and the Baltic states) in almost all EU member states, especially in 
the Netherlands and Germany, the pattern of dynamics is mixed for men: The 
small Baltic States, and also Greece, experienced a decline, and only a few of the 
countries  (Italy,  Poland,  and  Netherlands)  show  a  substantial  increase  in  male 
non-standard employment. 
                                                                                                                                      




Figure 2:  Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe,  










































Figure 3:  Aggregate non-standard employment rates in Europe,  




































Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; own calculations; the “aggregate” non-standard 
employment  rate  includes  part-time,  fixed-term  and  self-employment,  controlled  for 
overlaps.   
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The differentiation according to education
9, surprisingly, does not provide a clear 
pattern. One would expect a concentration of non-standard employment among 
low-skilled people which is, as we find at first glance (Table 1, Appendix), only 
partly  true.  Whereas  non-standard  employment  among  low-skilled  people  is 
common in Mediterranean countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece, many highly 
skilled  people  in  non-standard  employment  can  also  be  found  in  the  ‘social-
democratic’ regimes like Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands. 
Figure 4:  Share of skill-groups in nonstandard employment compared to 
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Source: Eurostat: Labour Force Survey; own calculations 
Confronting  the  shares  of  non-standard  employment  by  qualification  with 
corresponding  shares  of  these  skill  levels  in  total  employment,  the  pattern 
                                                 
9    According to ISCED (1997): Low=ISCED 0-2 (pre-primary education; primary or first stage 
of  education  of  basic  education;  lower  secondary  education  or  second  stage  of  basic 
education); Middle=ISCED 3-4 ([upper] secondary education; post-secondary non tertiary 
education; High= 5-6 (first stage of tertiary education [not leading directly to an advanced 
research qualification]; second stage of tertiary education [leading to an advanced research 
qualification]). The reader, however, should be aware of the dubious validity of these levels 
for comparative aims (Müller 2007).  
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becomes  clearer  (Figure  4).  Without  any  exception,  low  skilled  people  are 
overrepresented  in  non-standard  employment,  however,  with  great  variation 
across  EU  member  states.  We  find,  for  instance,  about  12  percentage  point 
overrepresentation in Denmark, 8 in Germany, and only 3 in the Netherlands (six 
percentage points being the EU-average). At medium skill level, the pattern is 
mixed, whereas at high-skill level, high skilled people are underrepresented in 
most  countries  (especially  in  Eastern  European  new  member  states),  with  the 
exception of Italy and Czech Republic. 
3.  Explaining the Dynamics of Non-standard Employment 
Many  possible  factors  would  have  to  be  taken  into  account  to  explain  the 
dynamics of non-standard employment. One would have to start with structural 
changes  on  the  supply  and  demand  side  including  their  interaction,  and  then 
scrutinize  institutional  as  well  as  policy  determinants  as  reactions  to  these 
changes, for instance taxation, social security reforms and labour market policies 
targeted  towards  specific  groups  like  elderly  and  women.  Last  but  not  least, 
changes  in  labour  market  regulation,  especially  those  targeted  to  non-standard 
work, would have to be considered.  
In  the  following,  a  pragmatic  approach  –  instead  of  following  a  systematic 
analytical framework – shall be applied to bring some insights at home.
10 Leaving 
aside  text  book  wisdoms  like  wage  elasticity  at  the  supply  side  or  marginal 
productivity at the demand side, such a perspective is both guided by interesting 
patterns observed as well as by considerations of policy relevance.  
The basic assumption guiding these considerations is the expectation that non-
standard employment is not only a risky and often unpleasant side effect of the 
new employment dynamics. It is, first of all, a central requisite for high labour 
                                                 
10   For  economic  text-book  versions  see,  among  others,  Ehrenberg/  Smith  (2003);  in  the 
framework  of  comparing  employment  systems  Schmid  (2008,  chapters  2  and  3);  from  a 




force participation in a modern economy in which both men and women want to 
combine family, life and labour market work. It can also be anticipated that in a 
knowledge economy people of all ages want to combine life-long-learning and 
work;  and  it  seems  also  plausible  that  in  an  ageing  society  –  in  which  the 
proportion of young and old fundamentally change – age is becoming an asset and 
not (only) a burden. Furthermore, non-standard employment in the form of part-
time, temporary or own account work may also replace, to some extent, flexible 
adjustment  forms  within  the  standard  employment  relationship  (e.g.  short-time 
work, overtime, job rotation) which have evolved in large-scale internal labour 
markets related to mass production in manufacturing. It seems that in knowledge 
based service economies dominated by project oriented work organization and 
horizontal  labour  division  employers  probably  have  to  rely  more  on  external 
flexibility with respective higher labour turnover. The resulting increase in non-
standard employment forms with corresponding higher risks for workers, then, 
would imply the necessity of developing new securities to avoid new forms of 
labour market segmentation. 
3.1  Is non-standard employment driving labour force participation? 
Before  starting  to  test  the  relationship  between  non-standard  employment  and 
labour  force  participation  in  a  preliminary  and  descriptive  way,  the  two  main 
reasons for expecting a positive relationship shall be made explicit.  
First,  from  the  demand  side  perspective,  deepening  labour  division  due  to 
globalisation  or  internationalisation  and  information  technologies  requires  a 
flexible work organisation in which individual job security may become a barrier 
rather than a requisite of high productivity. This does not mean that job tenure 
becomes obsolete  as a requirement for cumulating experience  and cooperation 
among complementary skilled workers. But it is safe to assume that either job 
security has to be combined with multiple skills, or individual job security has to 
be replaced by individual employment security in order to enable employers to 
mix  the  skills  according  to  the  changing  tasks  related  to  high-skill  diversity  
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production  often  based  on  projects  or  network  types  of  work  organisation 
(Marsden 2004). 
Second,  from  a  supply  side  perspective,  rising  labour  force  participation  of 
women (especially of those with high skills) increases coordination problems – 
for both men and women – between gainful labour market work and work related 
to care or education which money can’t (or should not) buy. Furthermore, higher 
living  standards  may  induce  people  to  value  free  time  for  leisure  or  self-
productive activities higher than additional market income, leading to claims of 
opportunities to transit between various employment relationships over the life-
course. 
Both kinds of reasoning lead to the expectation that labour force participation and 
non-standard  employment  are  developing  in  a  parallel  way.  This  expectation 
would  be  (at  least  provisionally)  falsified  by  significant  negative  correlations 
between non-standard employment shares and labour force participation rates. 
Figure 5 shows, however, a (albeit not very strong) positive relationship between 
the aggregate share of non-standard employment
11 and activity rate in 2008 for 24 
member  states  of  the  EU  (excluded  are  Cyprus,  Malta  and  Bulgaria).  As  the 
scatter  plot  makes  clear,  the  Scandinavian  countries  and  the  Netherlands  rank 
highest  both  in  terms  of  non-standard  employment  shares  and  labour  force 
participation; the new member states, but surprisingly also Italy, rank lowest. 
The “causal” interpretation of this figure would be substantiated if the change of 
both variables (the activity rate and the share of non-standard employment) would 
go in the same direction. Checking this for the change from 1998 and 2008 (not 
shown here), we find a positive but not significant sign (r = 0.16). The scatter plot, 
however, hints to – especially for the new member states – erratic movements that  
 
                                                 
11   Notice that we use here the shares of aggregate (part-time, fixed-term, self-employment) non-
standard  employment  in  total  employment  to  avoid  multi-collinearity,  since  non-standard 
employment rates are parts of labour force participation.  
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Figure 5:  Aggregate non-standard employment in percent of total 
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Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survey; own calculations 
 
Figure 6:  Part-time employment in percent of total employment and 
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destroy  the  expected  stronger  correlation.  It  is  very  likely,  that  the  overall 
relationship between non-standard employment and activity rates is “spoiled” by 
possibly opposite links  between the  components of “non-standard” jobs. So, a 
look on the differentiated correlations might give a clue. 
Figure  6  shows  the  relationship  between  the  share  of  part-time  work  and  the 
overall activity rate, which turns out – not unexpectedly – to be positive again and 
much stronger than the overall relationship. 
The assumption that part-time work might drive labour force participation is also 
strongly supported by the ‘dynamic’ scatter plot showing the changes of part-time 
(as percentage of total employment) and the changes of labour force participation 
from  1998  to  2008  (Figure  7).  As  to  be  expected,  the  correlation  in  the 
corresponding ‘dynamic’ scatter plot for women (not shown here) is particularly 
strong (r=0.64), but the nexus is also strong for men (r=0.43). 
Figure 7:  Change of part-time employment in percent of total employment 
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r =  0.58
 
Source: Eurostat: Labour Force Survey; own calculations  
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The positive correlation between the share of temporary (or fixed-term) work and 
the  activity  rate,  however,  is  rather  small  (Figure  8).  This  weak  relationship 
indicates already that fixed-term work contracts play a quite different role within 
the various employment systems represented in the European Union. Two outliers 
in  Figure  8  are  of  special  interest.  Although  Poland’s  overall  labour  force 
participation is low, its share of temporary work is high. In this country, fixed-
term employment rocketed from 514,000 (1998) to 3,207,000 (2008), whereas 
total  employment  stagnated.  The  reason  probably  is  the  lax  regulation  of 
temporary work which allowed until 2003 fixed-term chain contracts without any 
limit. Only in 2004, Poland introduced stricter regulation, except in the seasonal 
and temp-agency sector. In fact, the height of fixed-term contracts was in 2007, 
and the number of temporary workers declined slightly in 2008. 
Figure 8:  Temporary employment in percent of total employment and 
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Source: Eurostat: Labour Force Survey; own calculations 
 
On  the  other  hand,  Denmark’s  high  labour  force  participation  combined  with 
exceptionally low shares of temporary work hints to an alternative to fixed-term 
contracts:  low  employment  protection  combined  with  high  income  security 
(through  generous  unemployment  benefits)  and  high  employment  security  
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(through  active  labour  market  policy).  Thus,  flexibility  within  the  “standard” 
employment  relationship  might  serve  as  a  functional  equivalent  to  external 
flexibility through fixed-term contracts, a point to which we will come later. 
As  fixed-term  contracts  obviously  play  a  different  role  within  the  context  of 
different  employment  regimes,  it  would  also  be  interesting  to  look  at  various 
organisational forms of temporary work, especially at the role of temp-agencies as 
possible  mediators  between  employers’  predominant  interest  in  flexibility  and 
employees’  predominant  interest  in  security.  Professional  temp-agency  firms 
might be able to pool the risks in a way to make both interests compatible or even 
complementary by establishing a virtuous circle between flexibility and security.
12 
A first hint for such a potential positive role has already been provided elsewhere, 
indicating a positive correlation between employment participation and voluntary 
temporary work (Berkhout et al. 2010, chapter 1, figure 14). 
Unfortunately,  as  explained  at  the  beginning,  our  data  base  (European  Labour 
Force Survey) is unable to separate different organisational forms of temporary 
work. However, combining the CIETT Statistics (Berkhout et al. 2010, table 7) 
with  OECD  statistics,  we  can  look  at  the  relationship  between  temp-agency 
penetration and labour force participation rates (Figure 9). 
Utilizing all statistical information, it turns out – not shown here – that the corre-
lation is positive but weak (r=0.13).
13 However, if we skip the Nordic employ-
ment systems (DK, FI, NO, SE), in which temp-agency work is rather differently 
regulated than in continental or ‘liberal’ European employment systems,
14 we find  
 
                                                 
12   For an extensive discussion of the complex flexibility-security nexus, in which – apart from 
trade-offs – also virtuous and vicious circles are possible, see Schmid (2008, chapter 8). 
13   However, due to data restrictions, the country set differs from that used in the other tables and 
figures. On the one hand, it excludes some EU-member states; on the other hand it includes 
Switzerland (CH), the United States (US), Japan (J), and Norway (NO). 
14   Most important is, first, the late liberalization of temp-agency work; second, the dominant 
modus of collective agreements, especially in Denmark and Sweden; the upward dynamic in 
both countries (from a very low level), however, is remarkable. For more information see 
Berkhout et al. 2010, chapter 1.2; Ahlberg/ Bruun (2008), Arrowsmith (2009), Coe et al. 
(2007), and Hansen et al. (2009).  
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Figure 9:  Temp-agency penetration rate* and labour force participation 
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Source: Labour force participation (OECD Employment Outlook 2009); temp-agency work 
(CIETT, see chapter 1, table 7). Labour force participation rates refer to persons aged 16-64 
in UK, US, ES, SE; temp-agency penetration rates refer to 2007 in DK, HU, IE, IT, PT. 
*
) Temp-agency penetration rate=average daily number of temporary agency workers full-
time-equivalent as a percentage of total employment. 
 
a  stronger  positive  relationship  between  temp-agency  work  and  labour  force 
participation (r=0.41). Again with proper caution, this evidence allows the con-
clusion that at least some part of the higher labour force participation might be 
related to the ‘driving force’ of temp-agency work.
15 
The factor really “disturbing” the expected parallel development of non-standard 
employment and labour force participation comes with the third component of 
“non-standard”  jobs,  with  the  category  of  (full-time  working)  self-employed. 
Here, the scatter plot shows a surprisingly strong negative correlation (Figure 10). 
If  we  distinguish  between  men  and  women  (not  shown  here),  this  negative 
correlation is especially strong among women (r=-0.66). It is very likely that the 
                                                 
15   Note, that this observation does not allow a statement on the quality of related jobs. This 
requires looking at the individual level and long-term job sequences (‘careers’) related to the 
(potentially positive) intermediate role of temp-agency work.  
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share of self-employed (own account work without employees) is still strongly 
related to the importance of agriculture which is corroborated by the fact that this 
share declines in the respective countries (such as Greece, Spain and most of the 
new member states). It is probably safe to say that a “causal” point for a positive 
correlation between self-employment and activity rate can only be made related to 
the  modern  type  of  own  account  work  which  is  completely  unrelated  to 
agriculture  and  rather  connected  with  the  so-called  creative  sector.  The  latter 
informed  speculation  might  also  be  the  reason  that  own  account  work  even 
increased  in  some  rather  ‘developed’  countries  like  Netherlands,  Germany, 
Austria, UK and Denmark. 
Figure 10:  Self-employment (own account workers without employees) in 
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Source: Eurostat: Labour Force Survey; own calculations 
The speculation gets a bit more save by exploiting our possibility to differentiate 
between full-time and part-time self-employment under the assumption that part-
time  represents  more  the  modern  type  and  full-time  more  the  traditional  type 
(especially related to agriculture) of own account work. The following correlation 
matrix of the changes in the share of non-standard employment and the changes in 
labour force participation provides some interesting insights (Table 2).  
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Our expectation is at least partly corroborated by the different signs between part-
time and full-time self-employment in the expected direction. Furthermore, the 
strong correlation between the change of the share in part-time self-employment 
and change of labour force participation for women indicates that own account 
work may indeed serve as driver of labour force participation at least for women. 
Table 2:  Correlates of the changes in the share of non-standard employ-
ment and the change in labour force participation (1998-2008) 
  Total  Men  Women 
Part-time open-ended  0.60  0.48  0.65 
Part-time fixed-term  0.27  0.40  0.08 
Part-time self-employed  0.27  0.21  0.39 
Full-time fixed-term  -0.10  -0.02  -0.15 
Full-time self-employed  -0.25  -0.26  -0.03 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, own calculations 
The correlation matrix reveals three further insights. First, the change in open-
ended  part-time  work  strongly  correlates  with  the  change  in  labour  force 
participation, for the total and both for women and (a bit less) for men, which 
confirms our previous results. Second, it is interesting to see, that part-time work 
in fixed-term contracts correlates with labour force participation only for men in a 
‘significant’ way, not for women. This pattern (tentatively) may reflect the fact 
that  temporary  part-time  serves  only  for  men  as  effective  stepping  stone  for 
participating  in  the  labour  market.  The  dynamics  of  temporary  full-time 
employment is not at all related to the dynamics of labour force participation. 
To summarise this part, it is evident that only the availability of part-time work 
can be considered as a strong driving force of labour force participation. This 
conclusion is corroborated by the quite strong correlation (r=0.58) between the 
changes of the activity rates and changes of the shares in part-time work from 
1998  to  2008.  The  correlation  becomes  even  stronger  considering  only  open-
ended part-time work without self-employment. Temporary work, however, and 
especially  own  account  work  play  an  ambiguous  role  that  would  have  to  be  
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specified for the target groups of increasing labour force participation, especially 
related to women, the young and the elderly. There is some reason to believe that 
temp-agency  work  can  support  higher  labour  market  activity  of  people  who 
otherwise  would  become  ‘outsiders’  (the  young,  long-term  unemployed  and 
returning  women)  if  properly  regulated  and  professionally  organized.  There  is 
also  some  evidence  that  part-time  self-employment  drives  female  labour  force 
participation. 
3.2  Is non-standard employment related to structural change? 
Finding  a  positive  relationship  between  structural  change  in  the  economy  and 
non-standard  employment  would  further  corroborate  the  expected  parallel 
development  of  non-standard  employment  and  labour  force  participation.  The 
expectation  would  be  disconfirmed  if  we  would  find  a  significant  negative 
relationship between growing industries and non-standard employment. 
A direct preliminary test would be, again, a simple correlation with non-standard 
employment and the most dynamic growth sectors of the economy in terms of 
employment. As the proper statistical data basis for this exercise is not available, 
we present only scattered evidence from other sources. 
First,  a  special  study  in  Germany  (Statistisches  Bundesamt  2008)  about  the 
sectoral  composition  of  non-standard  employment  shows,  that  wholesale  and 
retail trade, restaurants and hotels, business services and social (especially health) 
services  are  most  prone  to  non-standard  employment;  the  least  prone  to  non-
standard  employment  are  the  declining  sectors  of  manufacturing  (apart  from 
temp-agency work being heavily concentrated in this sector) and construction (in 
which temp-agency was completely prohibited until 2003, since then only partly 
deregulated). 
Second,  two  shift-share  analyses,  again  in  Germany,  come  to  the  result  that 
structural changes in sectoral and in gender composition of employment explain 
some part of the decline in standard employment (and, vice versa, of increasing  
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non-standard employment). A study (covering the period of 1991 to 2007) finds 
that structural change of gender composition explains eight percent of the decline 
in  standard  employment;  and  structural  change  in  the  sectoral  composition 
explains  16  percent  (Sachverständigenrat  2008,  p.  438).  Another  study,  only 
concentrating on West-Germany and the period of 1985 to 2005, allocates even 27 
percent of the decline in standard employment to structural change in the gender 
composition  and  22  percent  to  structural  change  in  the  sectoral  composition 
(Schäfer and Seyda, 2008). 
Berkhout  et  al.  (2009)  provide  a  very  informative  sectoral  breakdown  of 
temporary  and  part-time  employment  for  all  EU  member  states  and  for  2007/ 
2008. If we look at countries with both high shares of part-time work and labour 
force  participation,  a  clear  pattern  emerges:  There  are  two  sectoral  clusters 
contributing most to part-time work: first wholesale, retail & repair plus hotels & 
restaurants; second, education, health & social work plus other community, social 
and personal services. 
The  picture  related  to  temporary  work  is  not  as  clear-cut.  In  most  countries, 
temporary work is overrepresented (relative to the average) in “other community, 
social and personal services”; the same holds true – with a few exceptions (for 
instance the Netherlands and Poland) – in education, health & social work and in 
hotels  &  restaurants  (exception  Denmark).  In  countries  with  exceptional  high 
shares  in  fixed-term  contracts  but  low  participation  rates,  temporary  work  is 
typically concentrated in sectors with seasonal characteristics or other peculiar 
conditions. Spain, for instance, employs in construction 45% of the work force in 
temporary work, and 32% in agriculture. Agriculture also attracts high shares of 
temporary  work  in  Germany  (13%),  Italy  (25%),  Slovakia  (9%)  and  Hungary 
(8%). Poland’s temporary workers are also highly concentrated in construction 
(35%) and to an unusual extent in hotels & restaurants (41%); Poland is also 
exceptional in having a high share of temporary work in manufacturing (30% as  
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compared to 12% for the EU-27 average).
16 Temp-agency work (not necessarily 
restricted to fix-term employment, but usually related to this contract type) does 
not  show  a  clear  sectoral  or  occupational  pattern.  It  seems  that  this  form  of 
temporary  work  plays  –  according  to  the  respective  employment  regime  – 
different  roles:  from  replacing  people  on  (growing)  leave  schemes,  thus 
contributing  to  the  stability  of  the  core  work-force,  to  simple  cost-cutting 
strategies, thus contributing to shifting employment risks to the most vulnerable 
workers. 
For  an  intermediate  summary,  it  seems  worthwhile  to  briefly  reflect  on  the 
sectoral pattern of part-time work which we have identified as the main driver for 
labour  force  participation.  Both  sectoral  clusters  in  which  part-time  work  is 
concentrated share a low level of labour division in producing or providing the 
services and a high share of self-servicing. Most of these services – especially the 
expanding education, health and social services – are directly oriented towards 
persons, often in interactive form. Many of these services have been provided in 
former times by unpaid household work or barter exchanges in neighbourhoods. 
All  in  all,  the  driving  force  of  part-time  work  seems  to  be  grounded  in  the 
interaction  of  changing  work  preferences  (especially  among  women)  and 
transforming formerly unpaid services into market transaction (‘marketisation’). 
3.3  Institutional determinants of non-standard employment 
As elaborated in the preceding section, structural change explains – both on the 
supply and the demand side – some but even not the major part of the dynamics in 
non-standard employment. Other determinants have to be considered, especially 
related  to  target  groups  with  low  labour  force  participation  like  women,  the 
elderly  and  low  skilled  people  (or  even  more  generally  the  “inactive”).
17 
                                                 
16   An analysis of self-employment according to industries or occupations was not possible here. 
17   Fighting  effectively  unemployment,  especially  long-term  unemployment,  would  increase 
employment, but not necessarily labour force participation since the unemployed are counted 
to the active labour force.  
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Obviously, institutional change – which means changes in the rules of the labour 
market game – has to be taken into consideration for further explanations. 
First of all, economic incentives through changing institutions of wage formation 
or  tax  treatment  would  have  to  be  considered.  Unjustified  gender  wage  gap 
through  open  or  statistical  discrimination  are  one  possible  factor  blocking  or 
slowing down the rise in female labour force participation (Mandel/ Semyonov 
2005).  The  same  holds  true  if  non-standard  employment  is  systematically 
punished by lower wages per hour, which is an established fact especially related 
to fixed-term employment (Schoeman et al. 1998).
18 
Well established is the fact that equal tax treatment for married women has a 
strong  positive  effect  on  female  labour  force  participation.  Married  women, 
especially  if  they  work  part-time,  are  taxed  more  heavily  than  men  or  single 
women in many OECD countries. Sweden is a good example where the transfer 
from joint to separate taxation in combination with other family friendly policies 
has led to higher labour force participation among women. A study for 17 OECD 
countries  shows  that  women  will  participate  more  when  they  are  being  taxed 
separately  and  equally  compared  to  men  (Jaumotte  2003),  and  another  study 
attributed to the change from tax allowances to non transferable tax credits of a 
recent Dutch tax reform a positive impact on female labour force participation 
(Bosch/ van der Klaauw 2009). 
Parental leave arrangements, both in terms of costs and duration, are important 
drivers of labour force participation, too. They are relatively well researched in 
the meantime, although the links between institutional arrangements and labour 
supply reactions can be quite complicated. Two main results, however, are well 
established. First, the availability of affordable care services is a strong positive 
driver, whereas long parental leaves combined with entitlements to return to the 
                                                 
18   More recent studies emphasize especially the wage punishment of fixed-term contracts for 
(higher) skilled workers; for Germany see Gebel (2009), for Italy Elia (2009), and for Spain 
Fernandes-Kranz/ Rodriguez-Panas (2009).  
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job  produce  ambivalent  results,  improving  participation  on  the  one  hand  but 
leading to wage and income penalties on the other hand (Esping-Andersen 2002). 
Drivers  of  labour  force  participation  for  elderly  are  also  well  studied  (OECD 
2006). Most important for early retirement were strong incentives by generous 
pension entitlements not calculated on an actuarial basis, a policy that most of the 
EU  member  states  withdrew  in  the  meantime.  Some  countries  (for  instance 
Germany)  still  have  strong  seniority  based  wages  which  reduce  the  transition 
probability into early retirement at least of the healthiest people. On the other 
hand, however, seniority wages hamper transitions of elderly unemployed back 
into employment, leading them often to escape into inactivity and on alternative 
transfer schemes like disability pensions. Comparative research also indicates that 
non-standard  forms  of  employment,  especially  part-time  and  new  self-
employment in service related local jobs can help keeping the elderly active on 
the labour market (Hartlapp/ Schmid 2008). 
Much neglected is the low labour force participation among low-skilled people, 
hinting to the possibility that an egalitarian education policy might be one of the 
most effective policies to increase labour force participation. Taking the European 
Employment Strategy’s main goal of full employment, namely, to reach an overall 
employment  rate  of  70 percent  by  2010  and  an  employment  rate  of  at  least 
60 percent for women, then the breakdown by qualification immediately shows 
where the main problem lies.
19 
Taking women as the main target group for raising labour force participation at 
the EU-level, highly skilled women already surpass the benchmark of 60 percent 
by 15 to 25 percentage points, almost regardless of the kind of welfare regime 
involved.  It  is  the  low-skilled  women  whose  opportunities  for  (employment) 
participation in the labour market are seriously compromised.
20 Portugal, Norway 
                                                 
19   I refer here to ‚employment participation’ because the skill level of the total active labour 
force is not as easily available; both figures, however, strongly correlate. 
20   The difference in employment rates between highly skilled and low-skilled people is also 
present among men but slightly less marked. I also abstract from critical qualifications with  
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and Switzerland are the exception, with employment rates of women already over 
60 percent. At the overall EU-27 level, low-skilled women are – with an average 
employment rate of about 45 percent – 37 percentage points below the average 
employment rate for highly skilled women. The employment rate of highly skilled 
Dutch women, to take an example of a ‘progressive’ country, is relatively high 
and matches almost that of the Scandinavian countries. However, although the 
Dutch figure for low-skilled women is above the EU-27 average, it is still far 
away from the Lisbon target (Figure 11). 



























































The figure includes some Non-EU countries for the sake of comparison: (AUS = Australia, 
NO=Norway, USA=United States of America, CH=Switzerland); “low skill” (ISCED 0-2), 
“high skill” (ISCED 5-6). Source: Eurostat; AUS and USA (OECD Employment Outlook 
2008, Table D, year 2006). For abbreviations of EU-countries see Appendix 1. 
 
Finally, a prominent candidate for being a barrier instead of a driver for labour 
force participation is employment protection regulation. Although its influence on 
employment dynamics is well researched in the meantime, its impact is still much 
                                                                                                                                      
respect to the employment rate as proper benchmark for employment policy. Apart from the 
quality of jobs, working time would have to be taken into account, especially for women who 
overwhelmingly  work  part-time,  many  even  in  marginal  jobs.  Information  on  full-time 
equivalents  would  be  necessary  if  increasing  working  volume  (important  for  economic 




21 As such, high employment protection shields the ‘insiders’ against the 
risk to become unemployed. The other side of the coin, however, is the higher risk 
of  unemployed  or  inactive  people  (the  ‘outsiders’)  to  remain  unemployed  or 
inactive.  Among  the  ‘outsiders’,  employment  protection  might  reduce  the 
employment chances especially for young people looking for their first job and for 
women trying to re-enter the labour market. Because other institutions or labour 
market  policies  might  intervene,  the  available  empirical  evidence  for  the 
theoretical expectation of segmentation is not clear-cut. Employment protection 
can  foster,  for  instance,  cooperation  among  employees  in  the  firm,  thereby 
increasing productivity and competitiveness, which eventually can result in higher 
labour demand, thereby reducing or at least mitigating segmentation. Forms of 
non-standard employment, thereby, might play the role as mediators or stepping-
stones to transform employment potentials into real and sustainable employment. 
However, employment protection might drive non-standard employment also for 
other reasons. Fixed-term contracts allow employers to circumvent employment 
protection or to combine external flexibility (hire and fire) with job security for 
the  core  work  force.  Both  possibilities  lead  to  the  same  consequence: 
segmentation between ‘insiders’ (with standard contracts) and ‘outsiders’ (with 
non-standard, fixed-term contracts). 
The theoretical relationship between employment protection and part-time work 
or self-employment is more difficult to establish. Open-ended part-time work is 
not more flexible than standard employment, and it is, as we have already seen, 
very  much  supply  driven  and  dominated  by  women.  New  self-employment 
(especially  in  the  form  of  ‘dependent’  or  fake  self-employment),  on  the  other 
hand, could be used for outsourcing certain functions, so that a slight positive link 
between  employment  protection  and  self-employment  might  be  expected, 
especially,  if  employment  protection  is  combined  with  high  non-wage  costs 
related  to  social  security  financing.  To  test  these  expectations,  we  restrict 
                                                 
 21  For an overview of the state of the art see OECD (2004).  
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ourselves  again  to  a  descriptive  test  by  simple  correlations,  which  should  be 
complemented in further research by multivariate analyses (Table 3). 
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0.39  0.13  - 0.16  0.62  0.19 
Source: Eurostat; OECD 2004; own calculations 
Figures in bold ‘significant’ (N=24 member states of the EU; Bulgaria, Malta and Cyprus excluded) 
1) Men in part-time, fixed-term or own self-employment in percent of working-age men (15 to 64) (2008) 
2) Women in part-time, fixed-term or own self-employment in percent of working-age women (15 to 64) 
(2008) 
3) Employees in open-ended part-time (without self-employed) in percent of working-age population (15 to 
64) (2008) 
4) Employees in fixed-term contracts in percent of working-age population (15 to 64) (2008) 
5) Employees in own self-employment (without part-timers) in percent of working-age population (15 to 
64) (2008) 
6)  Indicator  composed  of  eight  characteristics  of  employment  protection  against  individual  dismissals 
(OECD 2004) 
7) Indicator composed of four characteristics of employment protection against mass dismissals (OECD 
2004) 
8) Indicator composed of six characteristics of employment protection in case of temporary work (OECD 
2004) 
9) Indicator composed of 6), 7) und 8); all four indicators represent employment protection regulation 
around the year 2003; according to OECD-Employment Outlook 2008 (p. 132) no significant changes can 
be reported since then; most changes were related to temporary work in the direction of stricter regulation. 
The results largely meet the expectations. Generally, high employment protection 
seems  to  induce  high  non-standard  employment  among  men;  the  correlations, 
however, are not strong. The signs related to non-standard employment of women 
go in the right direction but the correlations are quite weak. Decomposing non-
standard  employment  into  the  three  elements  of  part-time  work,  fixed-term 
employment  and  self-employment  confirms  quite  clearly  that  individual  
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employment  protection  drives  up  fixed-term  employment  both  for  men  and 
women but not part-time work. 
The coefficients for self-employment have the right sign, but are rather weak. 
Employment  protection  especially  directed  towards  temporary  work  also 
correlates positively with the fixed-term employment rate (r=0.46), although the 
causal link might be the other way round (growing temporary work might induce 
tightening regulation). Collective employment protection seems to play no role in 
determining  non-standard  employment.  Finally,  the  combined  indicator  of 
employment  protection  hints  to  a  quite  strong  correlation  (r=0.62)  with  the 
employment rate in fixed-term contracts. 
3.4  Preferences for non-standard employment 
It is evident that asking people themselves about their preferences should provide 
insights into the reasons for non-standard employment. This raises, however, a 
measurement problem. Preferences cannot be directly measured, since preferences 
are not fixed or even not inherited. Preferences are also expression of economic 
constraints and cultural influences. It remains therefore unclear whether responses 
to corresponding questions reflect genuine choices (as expression of autonomy or 
free will) or the results of external constraints and influences. 
Despite these caveats, it makes sense to take notice of such surveys since they 
represent the results of individual decisions interacting with external constraints. 
Thus, being aware of contextual conditions, changes of such preferences in time 
and  across  countries  might  tell  a  story.  The  European  Labour  Force  Survey 
(ELFS) contains information about the reasons people are giving for being in part-
time  or  temporary  (fixed-term)  work.
22  In  the  following,  however,  we  cannot 
                                                 
22   Related to part-time, the possible reasons are: (1) undergoing school education or training; (2) 
own illness or disability; (3) looking after children or incapacitated adults; (4) other family or 
personal reason; (5) could not find a full-time job; (6) other reason; (7) none of these reasons 
applies.  Related  to  temporary  work  (fixed-term),  the  possible  reasons  are:  (1)  contract 
covering a period of training (apprentices, trainees, research assistance, etc.); (2) could not  
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exploit  the  whole  potential  of  this  information  available  and  have  to  restrict 
ourselves to some impressions.
23 
For part-time work (and year 2005) the following peculiarities are worth to be 
emphasised: A majority of women in Germany (57%) and UK (45%) mentioned 
“looking after children or incapacitated adults” as reason for working part-time; 
both countries are known as having relatively  conservative attitudes related to 
gender role models. This reason has little or no importance in countries having a 
reputation for progressive family and gender policy, for instance the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands and France. Here, many women just do not want to 
work full-time (Netherlands 74%, France 57%, and Denmark 41%).
24 
With the exception of Netherlands, the reason of not having found a full-time job 
is also common in these countries (France 29%, Sweden 25% and Denmark 18%). 
Employment  in  part-time  due  to  education  or  training  is  only  substantive  in 
Denmark (31%). Finally, a remarkable share of women in Sweden (11%) works 
part-time for reasons of illness or disability. Especially for the latter two reasons, 
it  would  be  desirable  having  this  information  broken  down  both  by  age  and 
gender. 
For  temporary  work  or  fixed-term  contracts  (here  referring  to  2007),  “person 
could not find a permanent job” is the most important reason given in almost all 
countries. In Greece, Portugal and Spain, over 80 percent of temporary workers 
prefer a permanent job (or an open-ended contract). The average in the 27 EU 
member states is 60 percent. Countries with a vocational training system in form 
of apprenticeship (combining ‘on’ and ‘off’ the job training) deviate from this 
                                                                                                                                      
find a permanent job; (3) did not want a permanent job; (4) probationary period; (5) none of 
these reasons applies. 
23   The following figures are taken from Berkhout et al. (2009). 
24   The  interpretation  of  these  results  is  corroborated  by  Gash  (2008).  The  methodological 
subtlety  of  this  study  consists  in  the  indirect  measurement  of  preferences  by  comparing 
transition  rates  (into  full-time,  inactivity,  other  employment)  of  part-time  workers  with 
corresponding  transition  rates  of  full-time  workers.    By  statistically  controlling  transition 
probabilities for socio-demographic and other factors, part-time working women in the UK 
remain longer in this status and in the same job than in Denmark or France.  
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pattern since apprentices per definition have a temporary contract, e.g. Germany 
(25%)  and  Austria  (20%);  combining  education  and  temporary  work  is  also 
common in Denmark and the Netherlands (about 35%). 
The pattern becomes even more pronounced if we concentrate on the age group of 
15  to  24  for  which  we  found  already  a  concentration  of  temporary  work.  In 
Austria  and  Germany,  over  80  percent  of  young  people  give  “education  or 
training” as the primary reason for being involved in a temporary contract, in 
Denmark 50 percent. 
Finally, in some countries, for example in Scandinavia, and especially in the UK, 
a substantive minority (about one third) doesn’t want a permanent job. One reason 
could  be  the  difference  in  wages  and  working  conditions.  In  Denmark,  for 
instance, it is reported that working conditions and wages for professionals and 
specialists, e.g. in the health sector, are often better in temp-agency contracts than 
in  ‘regular’  contracts  since  higher  employment  insecurity  related  to  these 
temporary contracts is compensated by higher wages (Ahlberg/ Bruun 2008, 41). 
Wages and working conditions in ‘everyday-labour-markets’, however, seem to 
be  universally  connected  with  less  attractive  wages  and  working  conditions, 
independent of the employment regimes. 
3.5  Reasons for self-employment 
The  analysis  would  need  further  differentiation  according  to  the  different 
components  of  non-standard  employment  to  get  a  full  understanding  of  their 
dynamics and various functions they play in the modern labour market. Since the 
state of the art is already quite developed for part-time work and for temporary 
work (including temp-agency work), we just refer here to some literature and turn 
to some additional reflections related to self-employment, especially in the form 
of own account work.
25 
                                                 
25   For non-standard employment see Mangan (2000) and Houseman/ Osawa (2003); on part-
time work Leschke (2008) and Sciarra et al. (2005); related to temporary work the ‘classic’  
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A study on the development of female self-employment on the basis of the ELFS 
(Strohmeyer/ Tonoyan 2007) reports that most of the increase in own account 
work from 1995 to 2005 took part in form of part-time work (54% compared to 
15% in full-time self-employment); the same pattern can be seen among men. The 
share  of  part-time  working  women  in  own  account  work  ranges  from  11%  in 
Greece, over 18% in France, 32% in Sweden, 38% in West-Germany to 68% in 
the Netherlands. On the basis of a Heckman-Probit estimation, the authors also 
found that “having a family with children” turned out as the most important driver 
for the choice of part-time work in self-employment. This pattern is especially 
strong in so-called “conservative welfare regimes” where public care facilities are 
still underdeveloped, and where traditional values concerning labour division in 
the family still prevail. Unfortunately, the study is silent about the combination of 
part-time  self-employment  and  dependent  part-time  work.  However,  the  great 
share  of  marginal  part-time  in  self-employment  seems  to  imply  that  –  as  we 
already speculated looking at the corresponding correlations – such combinations 
are quite common. 
This informed speculation is corroborated by a recent study in Sweden (Delmar et 
al. 2008)
26, which hints to a stepping-stone function of part-time self-employment. 
The  authors  find  persons  who  combine  own  account  work  with  wage  work 
constitute a majority of the total number of self-employed. Most people enter own 
self-employment  by  engaging  first  in  combinatory  work,  indicating  that  the 
decision to transit into self-employment is more complex than characterized in 
earlier research. 
Three  “transitional  motivations”  might  explain  this  astonishing  pattern:  First 
supplemented utility maximization, which means attaining psychological utility 
from  self-employment  by  retaining  at  the  same  time  economic  security  from 
dependent  wage  work  (so  to  speak  balancing  flexibility  and  security  on  an 
                                                                                                                                      
Schoeman  et  al.  (1998);  for  temp-agency  work  Storrie  (2002);  for  self-employed  Arum/ 
Mueller (2004).  
26   The empirical basis of this study is unique and representative for all cases of self-employment 
in Sweden from 1990 to 2002.  
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individual  level);  second  providing  a  hedge  against  the  potential  risk  of 
unemployment;  third  reducing  uncertainty  associated  with  entry  into  self-
employment or exit from self-employment. 91 percent of dependent employees 
enter self-employment as combiners, and only 9 percent of them start with full 
self-employment.  Of  all  combiners,  68  percent  go  back  into  dependent  wage 
work, and 32 end up as pure self-employed. Finally, 61 percent of the pure self-
employed  transit  at  one  stage  or  the  other  in  their  life  course  to  dependent 
employment, and 39 percent transit to a combinatory status. 
4.  Policy Debate 
Before discussing the main results, a big caveat is at place. Although a remarkable 
body of research on the consequences of non-standard employment for income, 
employment stability or social security is already available, important pieces of 
information  are  still  missing.
27  Proper  risk  assessment  of  non-standard 
employment  would  require  the  analysis  of  individuals’  long-term  transitions 
sequences over the life course (careers) to uncover whether risky events end up in 
status maintaining, integrative or exclusionary transitions.
28 Equally important are 
deeper studies on the functions of non-standard employment at the level of firms, 
especially  whether  they  are  mainly  used  as  instruments  of  short-term  cost 
reductions and shifting the burdens of risks to the non-standard employees or as 
instruments to improve long-term competiveness through diversified high quality 
production and enabling especially school leavers and young adults to accumulate 
work experiences and to improve their work-life balance in the ‘rush hour of live’. 
The first question to be raised is the consequence of non-standard employment for 
social security, especially in old age. In as far as pension entitlements are related 
to  wage  income,  the  corresponding  first  conclusion  is  to  attack  any  wage 
discrimination that might be connected with non-standard employment contracts. 
                                                 
27   For the most recent state of the art in the spirit of ‘transitional labour markets’ (TLM) and 
‘flexicurity’ see the excellent volume edited by Muffels (2008). 
28   For  criteria  and  examples  of  proper  risk  assessment  (including  the  important  element  of 
communicating risks and from a TLM point of view), see Schmid (2006).   
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As this might be self-evident for some countries, e.g. for Netherlands, for many 
EU  member  states  it  is  not.  Any  gender  wage  gap  obviously  hurts  above  all 
women  who  are  overrepresented  in  part-time  work.  Related  to  fixed-term 
employment, countries with no legal minimum wage are especially prone to wage 
discrimination. The main risk of (new) self-employment is the extreme volatility 
of the income stream over the life course, and many own account workers even 
remain at the lowest income level for a long, if not all the time. 
The  flip  side  of  this  coin  is  positive  wage  discrimination.  One  example  is 
continued salary pay in the critical event of illness often linked to the employment 
status.
29 Small or medium sized employers are less able than large employers to 
reinsure this risk with the likely consequence that they tend to escape into fixed-
term contracts in order to reduce this risk. Another and more important example 
are seniority wages, which originally served as an insurance device smoothing 
individual productivity changes over the life course. The rationale of this internal 
labour market institution diminishes with the need of higher external flexibility. 
As the corresponding coupling of pension entitlements to the last wage before 
retirement  became  unjustified,  most  countries  have  abolished  this  rule  in  the 
meantime.  Nevertheless,  even  if  pension  entitlements  now  are  consequently 
linked to average life course income, the transition to an intermediate spell of non-
standard  employment  (especially  part-time)  or  to  substantially  lower  paid  jobs 
does not yet pay. Under the assumption, however, that such mobility is necessary 
due  to  better  adapting  to  structural  change  or  reduced  individual  earnings 
capacities, or even desired due to changes in preference over the life course, better 
insurance  is  required  to  offset  the  related  risks  of  unemployment  and  income 
volatility  (Kalleberg  2009,  p.  16).  One  possibility  would  be  to  extend 
unemployment insurance towards an employment insurance that makes valuable 
transitions pay, among other through continuous vocational training accounts, life 
course saving systems or wage insurance (Schmid 2008, chapter 8). 
                                                 
29   With respect to the obligation of the employer to continue paying an ill employee’s wage in 
international comparison see Knegt/ Westerveld (2008); in the duration of this obligation (up 
to two years), the Netherlands is unprecedented in the rest of Europe.   
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The second question relates to the financing source of social security. The rise in 
non-standard  employment  logically  implies  not  to  link  fund  raising  for  social 
security  too  closely  to  the  standard-employment  relationship.  Otherwise,  the 
employment contract becomes, indeed, more and more an ‘exclusionary device’ 
(Knegt  2008).  Strategies  to  reconstruct  the  employment  contract  to  an 
inclusionary  device  –  which  means  to  develop  a  new  standard-employment 
relationship – are manifold. The respective varieties in the EU member states still 
require more systematic screening before one could start to recommend simple 
alternatives.  Nevertheless,  the  principle  alternatives  are  clear:  extension  of 
individual or collective private insurances, linking social security to citizenship 
status (‘basic securities’) or making public social security institutions – especially 
the employment contract – more inclusive. Many countries, for instance, have 
started to make additional private or collective insurance mandatory for employers 
and workers independent of their employment status. France, The Netherlands, 
Switzerland,  Denmark  and  Sweden,  for  instance,  have  reached  an  almost 
universal coverage of the employees by firm or branch level additional insurances. 
In contrast, for instance to Germany, these countries arranged such an extension 
either by law or by legally extending corresponding collective agreements. At the 
EU level, such national activities could be induced by directives, especially for 
own account workers for whom – in contrast to part-time and temporary workers 
– no such binding regulatory framework exists. 
Schulze Buschoff and Protsch (2008) argue on the basis of comparative studies 
that contributory financing systems with bottom down income thresholds are not 
suitable to cover the specific risks related to non-standard employment, especially 
not for new self-employed. They argue for an extension of tax financed basic 
income guarantees to cover the risk of extreme income volatility related to self-
employment and – to some extent – to fixed-term contracts. Tax financed basic 
income guarantees (‘folks’ pensions, national health insurance, earnings related 
benefits)  seem  better  able  to  balance  flexibility  and  security  than  contributory 
insurance schemes often based on corporate arrangements.  
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Basic income guarantees, however, usually offer only limited income protection 
in old age, and they are not designed to compensate for the higher income risks 
related  to  non-standard  work.  Some  countries,  therefore,  introduced  risk 
contingent  schemes  in  various  forms,  either  through  risk  related  contributions 
(higher premiums for higher risks, as it is common in work accident insurance) or 
through  mandatory  contributions  to  training  or  employability  funds.  France 
(higher  social  security  contributions  for  temp-agency  workers),  Denmark  and 
Sweden (better wages and working conditions for skilled temp-agency workers) 
and  the  Netherlands  (contributions  targeted  to  training  and  employability  for 
temp-agency workers) provide here ‘best practice’. The existence of such ‘active 
securities’ probably makes workers more inclined to take over the risks related to 
non-standard  employment.  And  to  the  extent  that  such  schemes  induce  an 
‘entitlement effect’, they might even promote higher employment in the formal 
sector and thereby labour force participation. 
The  third  question  is  to  what  extent  in-built  flexibilities  into  open-ended 
employment  contracts  should  be  considered  as  functional  equivalent  to  non-
standard employment. It seems that to a certain degree, internal flexibility can 
substitute  external  flexibility  through  in-built  flexibility  of  the  open-ended 
“standard” contract, for example, working time variability over the life course or 
job  rotation.  Contracts  that  include  the  possibility  of  long-term  working-time 
accounts are already one observable trend as an instrument to build in flexibility 
over  the  life  course  into  the  employment  contract  without  affecting  seriously 
income and employment security. Research, however shows, that the risks related 
to a fair implementation should not be underestimated. Employers, on the one 
hand, tend to use such accounts to overcome economic slumps like in the present 
times (2009/10), and small as well  as medium sized enterprises seem  to have 
difficulties to use this instrument. Furthermore, the state has to enter the game by 
ensuring claims to time accounts both in the event of insolvency of firms and 
workers’ transition between firms. On the other hand, employees often prefer cash 
(e.g.  for  working  overtime)  to  time  as  an  investment  in  an  uncertain  future.  
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Especially  tempting  for  them  is  the  use  of  such  accounts  for  early  retirement 
instead  of  investing  the  accumulated  accounts  into  employability  measures,  a 
behavioural  feature  that  doesn’t  fit  with  the  objective  of  raising  labour  force 
participation.
30 
Sweden  delivers  a  good  example  for  the  consequences  of  increasing  in-built 
flexibilities in terms of employment or labour force participation. The Swedes can 
be proud of having one of the highest employment rates of about 74 percent and 
well above the Lisbon goal. However, their effective employment rate – the rate 
of people in working age population actually working during the week – is only in 
the size of about 64 percent. Though precise statistics explaining this difference 
between ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ employment rate does not exist, the potential 
factors explaining this discrepancy are clear. The ‘good’ reasons are: despite an 
open-ended  contract  in  dependent  fulltime  work  (or  a  standard  employment 
relationship), many people do not work because they are on educational, parental 
or care leave. The ‘bad’ reasons are: despite an open-ended contract in dependent 
fulltime work, many people are not working because they are ill, in psychological 
trouble or absent for undeclared reasons.
31 
In as far as the discrepancy between ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ employment rate is 
not only a universal trend but also to be recommended for enhancing flexibility 
and  security,  then  the  full-employment  goal  of  the  Lisbon  strategy  set  at  70 
percent for 2010 is far too modest. In the long-term, this benchmark probably has 
to  be  set  at  80  percent,  a  benchmark  that  the  Dutch  and  Swedes  already 
established in their national employment programmes. 
                                                 
30   See, for instance, Delsen/ Smits (2009), Roman (2006), Wotschack/ Hildebrandt (2008). 
31   Another reason for the discrepancy between ‘nominal’ and ‘effective’ employment rate could 
be  institutional.  Germany’s  part-time  scheme  for  ‘gradual’  retirement  (now  abolished) 
provides an extreme example. The scheme subsidised five years part-time, of which the first 
half (2 and 1/2 year) could be taken as full-time, the second half as zero-time. Notice again 
that we used self-reported part-time figures. Thus, in the German ‘block-model’ of part-time 
work for elderly it might well be that the elderly ‘part-timers’ report that they work full-time 
in the first half of the scheme, but report being inactive or even not employed anymore in the 
second half of the scheme.  
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The trend towards non-standard forms of employment, finally, raises the question 
whether  all  this  leads  to  –  or  even  whether  we  need  –  a  new  ‘standard 
employment relationship’. Expanding the institutional status of the employment 
contract to all forms of employment, including even unpaid but socially highly 
valued work as proposed for instance by Supiot (2001), seems to be the most 
radical  and  most  promising  route  towards  a  new  standard-employment 
relationship. The main aim is the move from protecting jobs to protecting people 
or  from  job  security  to  labour  market  security  (Auer  2007).  The  old  standard 
employment  contract  would  be  transformed  into  a  new  labour  contract  which 
includes  income  and  employment  risks  related  to  transitions  between  various 
employment-statuses.  The  core  is  the  establishment  of  new  social  rights  and 
(neglected in the much quoted Supiot-Report) of new social obligations to both 
sides of the labour market. 
The new social rights would be new in that they cover subjects unfamiliar to 
industrial wage-earners on which the traditional standard employment relationship 
builds: rights to education and training, to appropriate working hours, to a family 
life  and  to  occupational  redeployment,  retraining  or  vocational  rehabilitation. 
Their scope would also be new since they would cover not only “regular” wage-
earners  but  also  the  self-employed,  the  semi-self-employed,  temp-agency  and 
marginal workers. They are new in nature because they often take the form of 
vouchers  or  social  drawing  rights,  which  allow  workers  to  rely  on  solidarity 
within defined and perhaps collectively bargained limits when exercising their 
new freedom to act. 
The new social obligations would be new in that they cover subjects unfamiliar in 
the traditional employment relationship: obligations to training and retraining both 
for  employees  as  well  as  for  employers,  to  actively  searching  a  new  job  or 
accepting  a  less  well  paid  job,  to  healthy  life  styles  and  occupational 
rehabilitation, to work-place adjustments according to the capabilities of workers, 
and  to  changing  working  times  according  to  the  needs  either  related  to  the 
individual life course or to volatile market demands of goods and services. The  
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scope of new social obligations would also be new since they would cover not 
only certain categories of workers or employers but also the core workers in open-
ended contracts and all firms independent of size and function. They would be 
new  in  nature  since  they  often  take  the  form  of  ‘voice’,  i.e.  being  ready  to 
negotiate at individual, firm, regional and branch level in order to reach mutual 
agreements and to accept compromises in case of different interests. 
In brief: The establishment of social rights and new social obligations into an 
inclusive employment contract would ensure the development of capabilities that 
not only ‘make workers fit for the market’, but that also ‘make the market fit for 
the workers’ (Gazier 2007). The management of working time flexibility over the 
life course thereby is, as we have seen, probably the most important driver of 
labour force participation that meets the otherwise empty ‘flexicurity’ ideal. 
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
(1) The main result regarding the nexus of non-standard employment and labour 
force participation is quickly told: it is part-time work – especially in its open-
ended form of dependent work – which drives labour force participation. This 
holds especially (and obviously) true for women but also (and less obviously) for 
men.  The  overall  driving  capacity  of  temporary  work,  i.e.  the  employment 
relationship in fixed-term contracts, so far was weak. However, it might become a 
forceful and welcome driver if good quality of jobs or stepping-stone-functions is 
provided,  but  it  may  also  remain  driven  itself  mainly  by  cost-cutting 
considerations of employers. Self-employment is ambiguously related to labour 
force participation since– in the long-term – countervailing tendencies let expect 
rather stagnation than an extension of this employment form. 
(2) The second important result is a deeper understanding of the dynamics of non-
standard  employment.  The  standard  employment  relationship  defined  in  its 
traditional  and  narrow  way  (as  an  open-ended  and  dependent  full-time 
employment relationship) declines and ‘non-standard’ forms increase. For the 24  
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EU member states represented here, the employment rate in part-time, fixed-term 
and self-employment (overlaps controlled) rose from 17.5 percent (1998) to 22.3 
percent (2008). The huge differences between the EU member states show a clear 
pattern: The ‘social-democratic’ employment regimes (Netherlands included) are 
at the top, but non-standard employment rates  are also high in family  centred 
‘conservative’ and in ‘liberal’ regimes. Apart from Poland (which deregulated – 
until recently – temporary work in an exceptional radical way), all East-European 
new member states are ‘underdeveloped’ in terms of non-standard employment. 
Whereas temporary work is mainly driven by cost competition and new forms of 
work  organisation,  the  main  underlying  causal  factors  for  part-time  work  are 
women’s strive for economic independence and the transformation of formerly 
unpaid  family  work  into  market  work.  Thus,  globalisation,  information 
technologies and ‘feminisation’ of the labour markets are the megatrends standing 
behind  the  increase  of  non-standard  employment.  Furthermore,  the  positive 
relationships  of  non-standard  employment  with  labour  force  participation  and 
GDP growth indicates that an increasing variety of employment relationship may 
well  be  one  of  the  preconditions  for  a  sustainable  economic  dynamics  and 
prosperity. 
(3)  The  third  important  result  relates  to  the  differentiated  role  of  the  three 
components of non-standard employment. Part-time work has clearly the strongest 
weight in this ‘partnership’. As it is (still) taken up mainly by women, this form of 
non-standard employment reflects above all restrictions in labour supply due to 
family obligations. And as many tasks, especially caring tasks, cannot or should 
not  be  transformed  into  market  transactions,  flexibility  of  working  time  will 
further be required if gender equality and work-life balance are highly estimated. 
Thus, non-marginal part-time employment in the form of open-ended part-time 
contracts say in the range of 20 to 35 hours a week deserves to be counted as part 
of a new standard employment relationship.  
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For temporary work, we observed a relatively slow upward movement, if not a 
stagnating trend. Poland is the great exception, but there are signs that the new 
regulation here might stop the rocketing upward movement in the last ten years. 
The study also made quite clear that temporary and open-ended part-time work 
are  complementary  due  to  their  double  function  as  recruitment  channel  for 
employers and as career-bridge for school leavers and young adults. Although the 
data base of this study did not allow a distinction of different forms of temporary 
work, other sources make clear that temp-agency work (although not necessarily 
restricted  to  temporary  work)  may  play  an  increasing  role  as  intermediate 
employment form and drive labour force participation by mobilising long-term 
unemployed and inactive members of the workforce. 
Regarding  self-employment,  first  attention  should  be  drawn  to  the  overall 
stagnating or even declining trend of this non-standard form of employment. Only 
a minority of the EU member states experienced (mostly from a low level) an 
increase in self-employment in the last ten  years. This result sharply contrasts 
optimistic  expectations  of  many  policy  maker  and  some  researchers  who 
sometimes see in self-employment a panacea for job creation or increasing labour 
force participation. However, it became also clear that this component of non-
standard employment deserves much deeper research, all the more because the 
phenomenon  of  fake  self-employment  erodes  the  strict  borderlines  between 
dependent work and genuine self-employment. 
Since we were not able – at this stage of  research – to skip self-employment 
related to agriculture, our data set contains probably two different kinds of own 
account  work:  a  traditional  type  related  especially  to  agriculture  and  partly  to 
conventional petty bourgeois self-employment, and a modern type related to the 
‘creative sector’ and to the new professionals in information and communication 
technologies. Whereas the traditional type is declining, thereby contributing to a 
negative relationship between self-employment and labour force participation, the 
modern type of own account work might contribute in two ways to increased 
labour  force  participation:  first  by  new  professional  (full-time)  jobs  for  new  
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markets,  second  by  offering  a  combination  of  ‘inactivity’  (mostly  activities  in 
unpaid care work) and gainful work or by providing a stepping stone for inactive 
people, for instance for women after parental leave, or for elderly after (early) 
retirement.  This  assumption  is  partly  confirmed  by  the  weak  but  positive 
relationship  of  part-time  self-employment  with  labour  force  participation 
especially for women. 
(4)  The  fourth  grave  result  is  the  unequal  distribution  of  non-standard 
employment among socio-economic groups. This observation, although not new, 
is  all  the  more  relevant  since  the  usual  higher  risks  related  to  non-standard 
employment in terms of income, unemployment, social security in old age and 
partly even in terms of health are sources of new inequalities if welfare states are 
not able to adjust their institutions to this new dynamics. Low-skilled people are 
overrepresented,  whereas  highly  skilled  people  are  underrepresented  in  non-
standard employment. The overrepresentation of low-skilled concerns especially 
people  in  fixed-term  contracts,  whereas  highly  skilled  people  are  substantially 
represented  in  part-time  employment  only  in  a  few  (‘modern’)  countries. 
Temporary  work  concentrates  especially  on  school  leavers  and  young  adults, 
whereas women are strongly represented in own account work, especially in its 
growing part-time form. The other side of the coin is the extremely poor level of 
labour  market  participation  among  the  low-skilled  which  hints  to  the  need  of 
substantive efforts especially in education policy to overcome this deficit. As far 
as education is (or even should be)  related to ‘on-the-job’ training, temporary 
work, including temp-agency work, might provide important ‘midwife services’. 
(5) These observations were reason to ponder a bit more about the underlying 
causes that erode the traditional standard employment relationship. Looking at the 
distribution of non-standard employment by industrial branches, the assumption 
of a continuous transformation of unpaid household work into market transaction 
driving especially part-time work and increasing female labour force participation 
was confirmed. This process encompasses the whole economy but concentrates on 
a  few  and  in  part  strongly  growing  sectors  (business  and  health  services).  In  
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addition, one can observe some common features in this process contributing to 
explain or understand the changes in the employment relationship. We find non-
standard employment often in sectors with low depth or breath of labour division 
(retail  trade  or  reparation),  or  in  sectors  with  strong  seasonal  characteristics 
(agriculture, construction, hotel and restaurants, tourism), or in sectors related to 
personal  services  (education,  health,  care)  which  often  require  interaction  and 
availability all around the clock (24 hours economy). This pattern underlies the 
likelihood that non-standard employment will further increase, but it also reminds 
that the rationale for open-ended (long-term) full-time employment contracts is 
still resilient. 
(6)  Labour  market  institutions  also  play  a  role.  Taxes  and  social  security 
contributions provide economic incentives both for the labour demand and supply 
side to search for employment forms with the highest returns or the lowest costs. 
High income taxes or social security contributions certainly do not encourage own 
account work except the respective people circumvent those rules by choosing 
informal (‘black work”) or even illegal forms of employment. On the slip side of 
‘going informal’, however, we find lack of social security in case of illness or old 
age  as  well  as  hidden  forms  of  exploitation  or  even  Mafia-kind  employment 
relationships.
32 We also found a surprisingly strong negative correlation between 
(formal) labour force participation and full-time self-employment, which hints to 
the  necessity  of  constructing  –  in  terms  of  social  security  –  a  more  inclusive 
employment relationship if one intends to stimulate this ‘non-standard’ form of 
employment for the sake of its supposedly creative and innovative functions. One 
possibility would be to subsidise social security contributions in times of low and 
volatile  income,  and  progressive  social  security  contributions  in  times of  high 
earnings. An alternative would be to radically change the framework conditions 
for multiple forms of employment and frequent transitions between these forms 
through a more inclusive labour law and social security legislation. 
                                                 
32   The Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen (2001, chapter 11) saw in the Mafia even a 
functional equivalent to formalized structures and entitlements to social security.  
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(7) Unequal taxation of male and female income favours marginal forms of part-
time  with  high  risks  related  to  sustainable  labour  market  careers  and  social 
security in old age. It also favours the traditional role division between men and 
women. The same holds true for non-targeted forms of wage subsidies in form of 
in-work-benefits, that allow combining wage and transfer income ad ultimo but 
keeping  people,  especially  women,  in  low  wage  jobs  without  promotion 
opportunities.  One  has  also  to  be  aware  that  albeit  "mother-friendly"  policies 
might  enable  more  women  to  become  economically  active,  they  also  might 
exacerbate  gender  occupational  inequality.  Comparative  research  shows  that 
lower earnings differentials between men and women in developed welfare states 
with high labour force participation are probably to be attributed to their more 
egalitarian  wage  structures  rather  than  to  their  family  policies.  Cross-national 
research also indicates that in contrast to extended maternal leaves, expansion of 
public sector employment and the provision of services such as subsidized day 
care are suitable instruments to increase labour force participation without doing 
harm  to  economic  outcomes  for  women  (Jaumotte  2003,  Mandel/  Semyonov 
2005). 
(8) High employment protection drives – as expected – fixed-term employment, 
especially for men. Fixed-term contracts allow employers to circumvent dismissal 
protection or to combine external flexibility (hire and fire) with internal security 
for the core labour force (employment protection) with respective loyalty and – 
may be – higher productivity. Both options lead to a segmentation of the labour 
market  in  so  called  ‘insiders’  with  open-ended  contracts  and  ‘outsiders’  with 
fixed-term contracts. Employment protection regulation, therefore, would have to 
be developed in a way that both flexibility and security complement each other in 
a  functional  way  without  enhancing  the  inbuilt  tendencies  of  labour  market 
segmentation.  A  ‘best  practice’  case  of  such  a  regulation  is  the  Austrian  new 
severance  pay  act  (2003)  based  on  ‘inclusive’  mandatory  employers’ 
contributions according to which each dismissed worker receives a payment, an 
entitlement that can be put into a savings account even if the person has only a  
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brief employment record or quits the job on his or her own. The former system 
required a minimum contribution period of three years, a rule that excluded most 
flexibility-enhancing workers who had low average employment spells. It trapped 
employers  as  well  (especially  small-scale  ones),  who  accumulated  substantial 
liabilities in the form of severance entitlements held by their employees with long 
periods of service (Schmid 2008, p. 293). Scattered anecdotal evidence hints to 
the  potential  positive  role  of  temp-agency  work  in  balancing  flexibility  and 
security through risk pooling and risk sharing (see also chapter 1 in this report). 
(9) Cultural factors also play a role in choosing – in as far as this choice is free at 
all – non-standard employment relationship. Unfiltered responses to preference 
questions, but also a few sophisticated studies provide evidence that women of 
‘conservative’ welfare regimes are still not very supportive to the transformation 
of care work into market transactions. They choose part-time work mainly for the 
reason to combine unpaid family work with some additional market income. With 
respect  to  temporary  work,  the  most  important  –  and  probably  increasing  – 
preferential reason is to combine education or continuous training and education 
with gainful work or to accumulate vocational experiences of various kinds in 
order to maintain or to improve employability. Due to their risk-pooling capacity, 
temp-agencies  might  play  an  important  role  for  optimal  job  matching  and 
recruitment, especially for school leavers and young adults. In countries with high 
levels of temporary work also for mature adults (like Spain or recently Poland), 
however, having no other choice is the main reason for temporary jobs, which 
means lack of jobs with open ended contracts. Such countries, probably, have to 
come  to  a  more  balanced  regulation  of  ‘flexicurity’,  not  least  for  the  sake  of 
higher  productivity  enhanced  through  the  ‘psychological  contract’  fostered  by 
open-ended contracts. 
Good  studies  on  preferences  and  on  the  dynamics  over  the  life  course  are 
especially missing related to (new) self-employment. However, we found a ‘best 
practice case’ of research in Sweden which produced in part thrilling results that 
probably  can  be  transposed  to  other  comparable  countries.  Apart  from  
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unemployment as an important driver to choose self-employment, most people in 
dependent work who decide to become self-employed choose a combination of 
dependent (part-time) employment and (part-time) self-employment to test under 
the  ‘safety  umbrella’  of  dependent  work  whether  own  account  work  might 
become  an  alternative  income  source  at  the  end.  Many  become  fully  self-
employed at the end, the majority, however, returns to dependent work or keeps 
the  combinatory  status.  Unfortunately,  a  conscious  employment  policy  that 
systematically supports or encourages such trial and error processes is not yet in 
sight. Labour market policy, so far, reacted in some countries only with respect to 
the target group of unemployed for whom own account work, however, often is 
only an escape route rather than a sustainable solution. Nevertheless, as evaluation 
studies  in  the  meantime  show,  employment  or  labour  force  participation  can 
effectively be promoted by this way.
33 
(10)  Last,  but  not  least,  our  results  hint  to  a  great  and  in  many  countries 
unexploited potential as functional equivalent to non-standard employment: the 
flexibilisation  of  the  standard  employment  relationship.  The  implantation  of 
flexible elements into the open-ended full-time contract can take various forms: 
agreements on regulated time-offs (sabbaticals) for various reasons such as child 
care, care for the frail elderly or the ills or disabled among the members of the 
family, training or educational leaves, physiological or psychological recreation. 
Such  agreements  provide  at  the  same  time  the  relative  security  of  a  formal 
employment relationship as well as the flexibility of working time according to 
the needs of the life course. They would also foster flexibility without destroying 
the  potential  of  open-ended  contracts  for  sustainable  ‘psychological  contracts’ 
between employers and employees. 
For  the  other  side  of  the  employment  contract,  the  employers  or  managers 
responsible  for  competitive  production  or  high  quality  services,  corresponding 
framework  conditions  have  to  be  created  enabling  them  to  cope  with  the 
                                                 
33   For Germany, e.g., see Baumgartner/ Caliendo (2007).  
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increasing costs and with the adjustment of the work organisation. However, since 
such a new standard employment relationship extends the expectation horizon for 
both  sides,  the  higher  costs  in  the  first  round  probably  will  be  more  than 
compensated  in  the  second  round  due  to  higher  motivation,  job  satisfaction, 
loyalty, productivity and competitiveness. 
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AT   Austria 
BE  Belgium 
BG  Bulgaria * 
CZ   Czech Republic 
DK   Denmark 
DE   Germany 
EE   Estonia 
GR   Greece 
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IE   Ireland 
IT   Italy 
CY   Cyprus * 
LV   Lithuania 
LT   Latvia 
LU   Luxembourg 
HU   Hungary 
MT   Malta * 
NL   Netherlands 
PL   Poland 
PT   Portugal 
RO   Romania 
SI   Slovenia 
SK   Slovakia 
FI   Finland 
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Appendix 2: Differentiated non-standard employment rates, 2008 
A2.1:  Non-standard employment rates in Europe according to three non-











NL SE DE ES DK UK PT AT EU  PL FI IT BE FR IE GR SL CZ SK HU RO LT LV
Part-time employed Fixed-term employed Self-employed - own account (only full-time)  
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey; own calculations; yellow=part-time (including self-




A2.2:  Part-time employed persons (including self-employed) in percent of 













A2.3:  Fixed-term employed persons (including part-time) in percent of working-
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A2.4:  Self-employed persons (only full-time) in percent of working-age 
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Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, own calculations  
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Appendix 3: Non-standard employment rates by skill, 2008 
  Low  Middle  High 
FR  5.3  8.6  5.4 
AT  6.1  13.2  3.8 
BE  4.9  8.7  7.3 
CZ  0.9  10.3  2.2 
DE  6.2  15.4  5.6 
DK  8.7  9.2  6.6 
EE  0.9  4.2  2.0 
ES  12.7  6.3  7.3 
FI  5.2  11.2  5.4 
GR  8.5  6.3  3.6 
HU  1.7  6.0  1.5 
IE  6.1  7.7  5.6 
IT  8.1  9.2  3.8 
LT  0.9  6.5  1.7 
LU  5.3  6.3  4.9 
LV  1.7  5.0  1.4 
NL  12.3  18.0  11.9 
PL  2.8  15.8  3.4 
PT  16.5  3.5  3.4 
RO  5.2  5.5  0.2 
SE  4.8  15.0  7.8 
SL  2.8  10.4  2.6 
SK  0.5  7.4  1.3 
UK  5.8  11.3  5.3 
EU (24)  6.6  10.7  4.9 
Non-standard employed by skill level in percent of working age population (15-64 years). 
According to ISCED (1997): Low=ISCED 0-2 (pre-primary education; primary or first stage 
of  education  of  basic  education;  lower  secondary  education  or  second  stage  of  basic 
education);  Middle=ISCED 3-4 ([upper]  secondary  education;  post-secondary  non  tertiary 
education; High= 5-6 (first stage of tertiary education [not leading directly to an advanced 
research qualification]; second stage of tertiary education [leading to an advanced research 
qualification]). 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, own calculations. 
 